Introduction
The relative average size of public spending in GNP for the OCDE economies has increased from 28,9% in 1965 to 41,7 in 1998. For the economies in the European Community, the public spending-GNP ratio has increased from 36,1% to 47,8% in the same period of time. Likewise, the evolution of the relative importance of the di®erent types of taxes on total public revenues shows a clear tendency towards increases in income taxes.
In the same time environmental policy becomes in the¯rst line of sight for the majority of government.
Recent macroeconomic theory has made progress in analyzing the dynamics e®ects of taxes, particularly within the framework of endogenous growth model. Barro (1990) looks at the government spending and income taxation in a model where government activity enters directly into production as a public intermediate input. The analysis of¯scal policies in endogenous growth models with human capital accumulation is relatively recent [e.g. King and Rebelo (1990), Lucas(1990) , Devereux and Love (1996) , Stockey and Rebelo (1996) , Ortiguera (1998) ]. These studies have basically focused on the relationship between tax rates and long-run growth rates.
In a Uzawa-Lucas setup augmented with an explicit treatment of the environment, Gradus and Smulders (1993) ¯nd that the optimal growth rate is independent from environmental care. Only by assuming that pollution also negatively a®ects the e±ciency in the human-capital sector, did they detect positive growth e®ects. Oueslati (2002) shows that in Uzawa-Luas model with leisure a higher pollution tax might boost longrun economic growth even without assuming direct positive productivity e®ects of a cleaner environment.
Whereas most endogenous growth models dealing with environmental concerns restrict the analysis to the steady state, little has been said so far on the short-run e®ects of taxation. Van der Ploeg and Ligthart (1994), Bovenberg and Smulders (1996) , Vellinga (2000) and Oueslati (2002) The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the general model is laid out and market solution is derived. Section 3 proposes a numerical exercise: we calibrate the model at the steady state, compute the transitional dynamics and comment the short-run dynamics. Section 4 computes welfare costs of public policy choice. Section 5, summarizes the main¯ndings.
The model
We consider an economy populated with an in¯nitely-lived representative household.
The household owns the stock of physical capital in the economy, K t , and is endowed with a (normalized) unit time. The time endowment can be allocated between work (remunerated at the current competitive wage rate) and schooling. The pollution causes a negative environmental externality as a side product. Pollution is assumed to a®ect individuals' utility.
Preferences, technology and pollution
The behavior of the rational household is guided by the maximization of the discounted lifetime utility
where
C t is consumption, 0 <¯< 1 is the discount factor and P t is the net pollution°ow.
The parameter Á represents the weight of pollution in utility. The consumer budget constraint can be written as follows :
where r t is the return to physical capital and w t is the gross wage rate per e®ective unit of human capital u t H t¡1 . u t is the supply of working time. ± K denotes the rate of depreciation for physical capital. ¿ The representative agent can increase his human capital stock H t , by devoting time to schooling. We assume that this activity takes place outside the market, and new human capital can only be obtained by spending time. Thus, the law of motion for human capital is given by the constraint
where B is the marginal productivity of schooling time (1 ¡ u t ), ± H denotes the rate of human capital depreciation and E t is public education expenses.
The physical capital used in production is the source of the pollution°ow P . This°o w can be reduced by means of private abatement activities D which in turn consume a part of output, in line with the°ow resource constraint. The net pollution function has the form:
Firms
The economy consists of a large number of identical and competitive¯rms. They rent capital and hire e®ective labor from the households at the interest rate r and the wage rate w respectively: They use the following constant-returns Cobb-Douglas technology
where A > 0 and 0 < ® < 1.
Firms are assumed to maximize their market value, which is equal to the appropriately discounted sum of pro¯ts°ows, the later is given by
Pro¯ts maximization implies that in equilibrium,¯rms pay each production factor at its marginal productivity.
Government
We suppose that government revenue Z t is used both as public abatement activity (D t ) and education spending (E t ). The government budget constraint implies that in every period, we have :
Let
The market clearing condition for the goods market is 
The market solution
The variables¸t and q t represent respectively the shadow prices of physical and human capital.
So as to characterize the competitive equilibrium, let us focus on the di®erent tradeo®s faced by the household. After eliminating the shadow prices for physical and human capital, the¯rst order conditions for the household problem write
Equation (13) and (14) are the Euler conditions determining the optimal accumulation of physical and human capital. It is obvious that environmental tax a®ects only the intertemporal incentive to invest in physical capital, as described by equation (13) .
These conditions, along with equations (2), (3), (4), (8), (9), (10) and (11) constitute a dynamical system in C, D, u, K and H which, together with the transversality conditions 1 and initial K (0) and H (0), fully describe the dynamic behavior of the economy along an interior equilibrium.
The balanced growth path
In this section we will focus on the dynamic properties of the balanced growth path.
De¯nition 2 A balanced growth path (or steady state) is an allocation fC t , Z t , u t , K t , H t , P t , T t g, a price system fr t , w t g and a taxes ¿ K and ¿ H satisfying De¯nition 1, and such that for some initial conditions K (0) = K 0 and H (0) = H 0 , the paths fC t , Z t , K t , H t g grow at the constant rate g, and u t and P t remain constant.
For analytical convenience we use the following transformed variables:
Using this change of variables, we obtain the following dynamic system r t = ®y t (15)
Steady-state values c, z, u, P and g are obtained by eliminating the index t. From the linearization of the above system one can show that, independently of the size of taxes, the model displays a saddle path dynamic structure. Thus, unlike other models presented in the literature [Benhabib and Perli (1994) , Bond and al. (1996) , Xie (1994) ] our model is unable to generate the indeterminacy phenomenon typical of distorted economies 2 .
Numerical results
In this section we derive a full numerical solution for the model. For this calibration exercise we cannot really hope to be as precise as those who employ the same model without environmental externality, since we lack strong empirical evidence concerning the nature of the environmental preferences and pollution function. Nevertheless, to the greatest possible extent, we follow the recent literature. Prescott (1986) cites micro evidence for many of the key parameter values are not as robust as those of the standard model, we vary some parameters around our initial benchmark setting as a check on the sensitivity of the results.
Calibration
The parameter values require are discount factor¯, technology parameters ®, A, B, ± K , and ± H , tax rates (¿ K and ¿ H ) and abatement share in public expenses µ. We proceed by choosing parameters according to the arguments below to pin down a benchmark economy.
Following Prescott (1986) and other, we let the share of labour in¯nal goods output 1 ¡ ® be 0:64. Let depreciation rates be the same across sectors and set equal ± H = ± K = 0:01 3 . Since the di®erence between A and B a®ects only the units in which the human to physical ratio is measured, we set A = B. Taking this as a proxy for the industrialized economies, the growth rate is 2 %.
2 In Bond and al. (1996) indeterminacy emerges from the presence of taxes in a model with physical capital as an input in the educational sector. As we assume that physical capital is only productive in the output sector, the condition for general instability or indeterminacy is never satis¯ed. In Benhabib and Perli (1994) and Xie (1994) indeterminacy arises from knowledge spill-overs.
3 See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, p. 37)
For parameters tax, we consider a parameter Á which correspond to a combination between ¿ H and ¿ K with a constant public spending-GNP ratio ³ = Z=Y . We let ³ BC = 0:3 which plausible for most developed countries. In the benchmark case, we suppose that ¿ H = ¿ K . Thus, we get Á BC = 0:136. 
Balanced growth paths
The numerical solution for the balanced growth path is easily derived using a nonlinear equations solution procedure for the stationary representation for the system (15)- (21).
We study now successively the e®ect on the steady state of both change in the structure of public spending, described by µ variation and variation in the government revenue, described by Á change.
Public spending structure
The¯rst governmental policy consists in doing a change in its expenses structure. This policy is shown by the variation of µ. Thus, when µ is higher, abatement share is higher.
This policy induce a decrease in the ratio h (production become less intensive in physical capital) and a decrease in the pollution°ow. The consumption share in the product remain constant (see table 1 ). We note that all this e®ects are insensitive to ® and ³(see table 2 and 3). 
Government revenue structure
We study now the e®ects of taxes reform on the steady state. We have calculated a parameter (Á), which measures the variation in ¿ K and ¿ H for a constant government revenue.
A public policy which favor the physical capital taxation, induce an intensive production in human capital and a fall in consumption share. We note too that pollution°ow rises. 
Transitional dynamics
To compute the transitional dynamics we log-linearize the dynamic system (??)-(??) to make the equations approximately linear in the log-deviations from the steady state.
After doing this, we solve the recursive equilibrium law of motion via the method of undetermined coe±cients. We compute the transitional dynamics associate with to kind of public policy.
Spending shares change
The simulation of the transitional dynamics starts in period 0, where the government suddenly changes the spending shares (µ). This public policy shock induces an instantaneous reaction of all economic variables. We then observe di®erent impacts on the variables, which leave their initial level at BC and reach at di®erent rates their new level. The pace at which the economy reaches the new steady state is the result of the interaction between some e®ects. In the short-run, the stock of physical capital decreases, but inherits an increased trend after a while, and¯nally its growth rate reaches its initial BC level. Thus, this policy induces a factorial reallocation e®ect, which reduces the intensity of physical capital in production.
A higher µ level increases the human capital-physical capital ratio (h) because the factor H is substituted for the factor K. In the beginning of the transitional dynamics, the crowding out e®ect of abatement reduces both the growth rate (see¯gure 1.a) and the ratio of physical capital to production (see¯gure 1.b). Increased abatement spending leads to a more human capital intensive¯nal output. The immediate response to this policy is a sectorial reallocation of resources, which reduces the physical capital-human capital ratio.
Taxes structure change
The simulation of the transitional dynamics starts in period 0, where the government suddenly changes the Taxes structure change (Á). This¯scal policy shock induces an In the short-run, the stock of physical capital decreases, but inherits an increased trend after a while, and¯nally its growth rate reaches its initial BC level.
A higher Á increases ¿ K and decreases ¿ H . In the beginning of the transitional dynamics, the crowding out e®ect of abatement reduces both the growth rate (¯gure 2.a) and the ratio of physical capital to production (¯gure 2.b). Abatement and education spending shares in the production are insensitive to the public policy shocks. Pollution°o w falls.
5 Welfare analysis
Welfare decomposition
We decompose welfare into transitional welfare (also referred to as the short-run welfare) W 1!2 corresponding to the economy's transition from (BC) to a new steady state (NSS), and welfare related to the NSS W 2 . So as to get a numerical result, we suppose that the transition from a steady state to another is achieved in a¯nite amount of periods, and we simply denote T the date at which we consider that the economy has numerically reached its new rest point. The total welfare associated to the environmental policy change W T ot is equal to the sum of utility°ows, from t = 0 to 1, which can be written as the sum of W 1!2 and W 2 :
Note that the economy converges only asymptotically to the steady state, and we therefore truncate the transitional dynamics in the e®ective computation at the horizon T .
This horizon is chosen so that for all t > T , the di®erence between the value of physical capital stock at T (k T ) and its value at NSS (k 2 ) is numerically very small 4 .
Formally, the transitional welfare can be written 5 :
the welfare related to the new steady state (NSS) is given by:
and the welfare related to the BC steady state is given by
Welfare cost:
To obtain a meaningful evaluation of the welfare cost associated to our policy change, we express all welfare measures as percentage point of the permanent consumption that generates an equivalent welfare in the benchmark case. Thus, our welfare cost measures the compensation in consumption terms that leaves the consumer indi®erent between the BC consumption path and the NSS consumption path corresponding to a change in scal policy.
Let us de¯ne e c 2 as the constant°ow of consumption that gives a welfare W T ot when pollution disutility and growth rate are constant. 4 We tolerate a di®erence between k T and k (¿ p ) smaller than 10 ¡10 . 5 The formal computation of welfare decomposition is available on request. 6 We assume that K ¡1 = 1 13 e c 2 = exp
The total welfare cost is given by¸=
where e c 1 = exp Table 7 gives a number of welfare and welfare cost¯gures. We look at the welfare cost of revenue-equivalent increases in the abatement share.
Welfare cost of spending shares change
Higher is the abatement share, higher is the welfare cost. Table 8 gives a number welfare of welfare costs induced by a tax reform. We show that when we increase physical capital tax we have a lower welfare cost.
Welfare cost of taxes structure change

Conclusion
We have studied in this paper the short-run and long-run behavior of an economy responding to two kind of public policy. The model used is a version of a two sector endogenous growth model within an environmental externality. Our ambition was to explored the e®ects of both tax change and expenditures structure on the welfare. We showed that a public policy which centre on spending structure leads a higher welfare cost. However, government might reduce welfare cost with a revenue-equivalent physical capital increases.
In a later version, we will explore the same public policy trade-o®s when the growth rate is a®ected.
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